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Abstract
The impetus for the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact was the Rana Plaza industrial disaster, which took the lives of
roughly 1,200 garment workers and injured twice. The Compact required the fulfilment of several time-bound commit-
ments by the Bangladesh government in two key areas—labour law reform and protection of the right to freedom of
association and ensuring fire and building safety. The EU heralded the Compact as an innovative, multilateral approach
to encourage its trade partners to comply with ILO core labour rights. The editors of this issue of Politics and Governance
asked the contributing authors to examine effectiveness of trade and labour standards and to consider alternative mecha-
nisms to advance workers’ rights. Specifically, they queried whether the Compact could be considered a new and effective
alternative model. This hope appears misplaced.
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1. Introduction
On 8 July 2013, the European Union and the govern-
ment of Bangladesh, with support from the International
Labour Organisation (ILO), negotiated the Bangladesh
Sustainability Compact (hereinafter the ‘Compact’; Direc-
torate General for Trade, 2013).1 The impetus for the
Compact was the Rana Plaza industrial disaster, which
only three months earlier had killed nearly 1,200 gar-
ment workers and injured twice as many (Manik & Yard-
ley, 2013). Built several stories taller than permitted, the
poorly constructed building collapsed when vibrations
from the generators on the rooftop shook the building.
For the EU, this was a crisis as several flagship European
brands, which had long touted social responsibility, had
imported billions of euro worth of garments from facto-
ries in Bangladesh—from Rana Plaza andmany other fac-
tories just as unsafe (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2015).2
The Compact required the government of
Bangladesh to fulfil several time-bound commitments,
including measures to ensure fire and building safety
in the readymade garment (RMG) sector and measures
to protect the right to freedom of association and to
bargain collectively, including labour law reform. The
lack of a trade union to stand up to management, who
had forced workers into the Rana Plaza building even
as cracks appeared on the interior walls, was an impor-
tant factor in the high death toll (Human Rights Watch,
2016).3 Further, the ILO had for years urged the govern-
ment (unsuccessfully) to amend its labour laws and to
enforce those already on the books. Parallel to the Com-
pact, donor governments contributed millions of Euro
for capacity building projects (ILO, 2017a).
The editors of this issue of Politics and Governance
asked contributing authors to examine the effective-
ness of trade and labour standards and consider alter-
1 The US and Canada joined the Sustainability Compact later.
2 It provides a list of brands linked to Rana Plaza.
3 “Let’s remember that none of the factories operating in Rana Plaza had trade unions” said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director. “If their workers had
more of a voice, theymight have been able to resist managers who ordered them to work in the doomed building a day after large cracks appeared in it”.
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native mechanisms to advance workers’ rights. Specifi-
cally, they queried whether the Compact could be con-
sidered a new and effective approach. As I argue below,
the Compact has not been effective for much of its four
years, though recent developments in mid-2017 might
yet produce some results. For comparison, I examine an-
other initiative which operated in Bangladesh at roughly
the same time, namely the Bangladesh Accord for Fire
and Building Safety (Accord), which is a private initiative
between international trade unions and apparel brands.
Though more limited in scope, namely to ensure fire and
building safety in RMG factories sourcing to signatory
brands, the Accord has produced positive results and
has essentially eliminated work-related fatalities in cov-
ered factories.
2. What is the Compact?
Simply put, the Compact is a compliance plan negoti-
ated under the auspices of the EU’s Generalised Sys-
tem of Preferences’ “Everything but Arms” (EBA) pro-
gramme (European Parliament, 2012). The EBA is a uni-
lateral scheme that eliminates tariffs and quotas on all
goods (except arms) exported to the EU. To maintain
these trade benefits, beneficiary countries must respect
certain standards including not engaging in “serious and
systematic” violations of the eight ILO fundamental con-
ventions.4 In the case of “serious and systematic” viola-
tions, the EU can initiate an investigation which can lead
to the suspension orwithdrawal of trade preferences (Eu-
ropean Parliament, 2012).5
At the launch of the Compact, then-EU Trade Com-
missioner Karel DeGucht explicitly linked the Compact to
the EBA (De Gucht, 2013).6 In 2015, Trade Commissioner
Cecilia Malmström indicated that the EU might recon-
sider its stand on the EBA if compliancewith the terms of
the Compact did not improve (Malmström, 2015).7 This
position was reinforced most recently in 2017 in a pair
of strongly-worded letters from the European Commis-
sion to the government of Bangladesh (discussed below)
threatening an imminent investigation and the loss of
trade preferences.8 In the end, the Compact is a specific
plan as to how to comply with the EBA and draws its co-
ercive power from the threat of EBA suspension. Govern-
ments have long used trade preference programs to seek
improvement on labour rights—including through check-
lists like the Compact (US Department of Labor, 2013).9
The Compact is monitored through an intergovern-
mental process, the so-called “3+5 Group”, (the Labour,
Commerce and Foreign Affairs Ministries of Bangladesh
+ representatives of the EU, US, Canada and two rotat-
ing EU member states) and is supported by the ILO. The
Group also holds a public summit on a roughly annual
basis, alternating between Brussels and Dhaka, which
also allows for the participation of stakeholders, includ-
ing trade unions, in the monitoring process. The most re-
cent summit was held on 18 May 2017 in Dhaka. At the
same time, there have been frequent informal communi-
cations between the EU and international trade unions
between formal summits. The EU has published three
technical status reports, in 2014 (European Commission,
2014), 2015 (European Commission, 2015), and 2016
(European Commission, 2016a), evaluating the govern-
ment’s compliance. They draw on information provided
by the government and social partners including the In-
ternational Trade Union Confederation (2017). Follow-
ing each summit, the 3+5 Group has issued Joint Con-
clusions in 2015, 2016 (European Commission, 2016b)
and 2017 (European Commission, 2017a) reflecting the
sense of the parties, including that of the government of
Bangladesh, and setting forth agreed next steps.
In making its assessment, the EU also gives great def-
erence to the ILO supervisory system. The ILO’s Com-
mittee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations has published increasingly criti-
cal reports related to the issues covered by the Com-
pact, in particular ILO Conventions 87 (freedom of asso-
ciation) and 98 (collective bargaining) (ILO, 2017b). For
several consecutive years, Bangladesh’s compliance with
ILO Convention 87 has also been the subject of super-
vision by the ILO’s Conference Committee on the Appli-
cation of Standards (CAS), a tripartite body which gives
follow-up recommendations to the annual reports of the
ILO Committee of Experts (ILO, 2017b). In 2016, the CAS
was so concerned with the government’s failure to apply
Convention 87 that it put its conclusions on Bangladesh
in a “special paragraph” of the Committee’s report to
the International Labour Conference (ILO, 2016a). This
4 For a list of those conventions, see http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommend
ations/lang--en/index.htm
5 Under Article 19, trade preferences can be withdrawn for “serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Part A
of Annex VIII”. These conventions include the eight ILO core conventions, including the right to freedom of association and to bargain collectively.
6 “Bangladesh also enjoys an extremely favourable trade regime under the EU’s ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative. This is of particular importance for ready-
made garments, which represent about 90 percent of Bangladesh’s exports to the EU. These enter the EU market with no restriction: duty-free and
quota-free. These exports to the EU account for about 2.5 million jobs—mostly for women. ‘Everything but Arms’ is therefore a major contributor to
job and income generation for millions of people in Bangladesh. I want to make it clear that Bangladesh—or for that matter any other Least Developed
Country—cannot take for granted the trade preferences it currently enjoys” (De Gucht, 2013).
7 “But the future of the garment industry depends not just on the price of its products but also on its reputation with consumers. And that reputation
will simply not survive another disaster like this. Another tragedy, or even just a continuation of today’s poor conditions for workers, could also force
the European Union to revisit Everything but Arms. It remains, after all, conditional on respect for fundamental labour rights” (Malmström, 2015).
8 Although other key market actors like the US and Canada participate in the Compact’s supervisory process, the leverage is held entirely held by the EU
and is derived from the potential loss of the EBA. The US already suspended GSP to Bangladesh in 2013 (described below), losing much of its economic
leverage. Canada does not condition its GSP on compliance with labour rights and is in any case a very small consumer market compared to the EU and
the US.
9 See indeed, in 2013 the US developed a checklist for Bangladesh to regain GSP benefits, which it suspended after Rana Plaza.
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is meant to signal a serious failure on the part of a gov-
ernment to apply a ratified convention (ILO, 2011). An
ILO High Level Tripartite Mission also visited the country
in April 2016, and issued a highly critical report on the
violations of freedom of association, thus corroborating
the allegations made by the trade unions (ILO, 2016b).
These reports were incorporated into the EU’s technical
status reports to the extent that they touched on issues
relevant to the Compact.
3. What Has the Compact Accomplished?
Respect for labour rights in Bangladesh has remained
extremely low, except for an all-too-brief period imme-
diately following the Rana Plaza disaster when global
scrutiny on the country’s labour practices was at its
most intense. However, after the immediate shock wore
off, global apparel brands purchased goods from their
Bangladeshi suppliers at record rates (Matsangou, 2016).
The government quickly came to realise that the indus-
try would face no economic consequences for its bad be-
haviour and thus recommenced its repression of workers
(by act or omission). Below, I highlight some of the key is-
sues which the government of Bangladesh was required
to address under the Compact. In every case, the govern-
ment failed to deliver as required.
3.1. Implementation and Enforcement of Labour Law
The Compact required that the government implement
and enforce its labour laws.10 Two critical implementa-
tion issues have been consistently raised—the failure
of the government to register unions and the failure
of the government to investigate or sanction employers
who engage in anti-union discrimination. These two ar-
eas were specifically identified elsewhere in the Com-
pact as a prerequisite for establishing the ILO’s Better
Work programme.11
3.2. Refusal to Register Unions
For many years, the government had implemented a no-
union policy in the RMG sector. Workers who sought
to register unions often saw the founders sacked and
the registration processes drag on without end. Imme-
diately following the Rana Plaza disaster, the govern-
ment felt significant pressure, from governments, unions
and brands, to reverse its no-union policy. In late 2013
and 2014, new unions were formed and successfully reg-
istered, though collective bargaining was still opposed.
However, by early 2015, the government again routinely
rejected registration applications. From 2010–2017, half
of all applications for union registration were denied. Of
860 total applications, 424 were granted and 417 were
rejected—the bulk of the rejections coming in 2015–
2016.12 The number of registration applications also
dropped precipitously from the peak in 2014 (392) to
2016 (130), as anti-union discrimination continued and
intensified with impunity.13 Some unions, namely those
that had been the most successful in organising workers,
have been told by the authorities not to bother applying
as their applications would be rejected.14
The reasons for the rejections are often completely
fabricated and have no basis in the regulations. In other
cases, applications were rejected even after unions cor-
rected them per the government’s instructions. As ex-
plained in the section below, public officials are poorly
resourced and are under considerable pressure from the
garment industry, which has significant influence over
the government, to keep the industry union-free. The
2016 ILO High Level Mission report noted that the proce-
dure for registering unions “had the likelihood of discour-
aging trade union registration” (ILO, 2016b, para. 43). In
2017, the ILO Committee of Experts called on the govern-
ment “to take any necessarymeasures to ensure that the
registration process is a simple formality, which should
not restrict the right of workers to establish organiza-
tions without previous authorization” (ILO, 2017c). The
European Commission also noted that “that there has
been a marked increase in rejections of registration re-
quests and a decrease in registration of trade unions over
the last months” (ILO, 2016a).
In 2017, the government adopted standard operat-
ing procedures (SOPs) for union registration. The SOPs
do provide timelines for registration and indicate who is
responsible at each step of the registration process. How-
ever, the SOPs fail to address the many barriers work-
ers face in the registration process and, without effec-
tive mechanisms in place to sanction Joint Directorate
of Labour staff when applications are arbitrarily denied,
unions in Bangladesh expect this behaviour to continue.
For example, in March 2017, workers at Savar Fac-
tory and Orchid Garment, both owned by the power-
ful Azim Group, had their application for union registra-
tion rejected for the third time. The reasons given were
vague, likely indicating the political influence of the Azim
Group. Indeed, Mr. Azim was himself a member of Par-
liament. Workers at both factories had been organizing
with the Bangladesh Independent Garment Union Fed-
eration (BIGUF) since early 2016. In May 2017, thugs at-
tacked union leaders and nearly 70 workers from Orchid
Sweaters outside of the factory gate (IndustriALL Global
Union, 2017a).
3.3. Anti-Union Discrimination
The leaders of many of the unions registered post-2013
have suffered retaliation, sometimes violent, by manage-
10 Compact, Section 1b.
11 Compact, Section 1f.
12 The data has been compiled by the Solidarity Centre and is available upon request.
13 The data has been compiled by the Solidarity Centre and is available upon request.
14 This information has been conveyed to the Solidarity Centre by affected unions.
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ment or their agents. Some union leaders were brutally
beaten and hospitalized (Human RightsWatch, 2015; see
also Human RightsWatch, 2014). Entire executive boards
have been sacked. In some cases, the police, at the appar-
ent behest of factorymanagement, have intimidated and
harassed trade unionists (Human Rights Watch, 2015).
The responses by the labour inspectorate have been very
slow to date. Most union leaders or members illegally
fired for trade union activity have not been reinstated
and most employers have not been punished for these
egregious violations. In cases of anti-union violence, po-
lice routinely fail to carry out credible investigations, if at
all. In the few cases where workers have been reinstated,
it was the result of an international campaign to pressure
brands, not because of labour inspection and enforce-
ment by the government (Greenhouse & Tabuchi, 2015).
This of course is not a reliable or sustainable model to
enforce the law.
The ILO High Level Tripartite Mission Report “noted
with concern the numerous allegations of anti-union
discrimination and harassment of workers” as well as
“blacklisting, transfers, arrests, detention, threats and
false criminal charges” (ILO, 2016b). In 2017, the Com-
mittee of Experts also expressed “concern” regarding the
reports “alleging numerous instances of anti-union dis-
crimination, slowness of the labour inspectorate in re-
sponding to such allegations and the lack of adequate
sanctions in practice, as well as a serious lack of commit-
ment to the rule of law” (ILO, 2017D). The EU also urged
the government “to address these reports without delay
and notably by taking the necessary steps to ensure the
effective investigation and prosecution of these cases, by
ensuring reinstatement of those illegally dismissed and
by imposing fines or criminal sanctions according to the
law” (European Commission, 2016a).
3.4. Implementing Rules
The Compact has required Bangladesh to pass imple-
menting regulations to the Bangladesh Labour Act,
which had just been amended in 2013 (Government of
Bangladesh, EU, & ILO, 2013). In late 2015, two years
past due, the government did issue the regulations. How-
ever, many of its provisions violate ILO Convention 87.
For example, employers are given a role in the elec-
tion committee of worker representatives to factory-
level Worker Participation Committees. Where there is
no union, which is the case in the vast majority of work-
places,Worker Participation Committees determinewho
is on the Safety Committees. If a worker vacancy opens
on the Safety Committee, employers also have a role in
determining who should replace the worker represen-
tative. The probability of management domination of
these committees is high, and there does not appear to
be a clear and dissuasive sanction for such acts of inter-
ference. Given the centrality of safety concerns in the
post-Rana Plaza period, the failure of the new rules to en-
sure that Safety Committees are independent ofmanage-
ment and thus free to identify and protest unsafe work-
ing conditions creates the potential for future safety and
health disasters.
The ILO concurred, urging the government “to under-
take any necessary measures to ensure that, under the
Bangladesh Labour Rules, workers’ organizations are nei-
ther restricted nor subject to interference in the exercise
of their activities and internal affairs, that unfair labour
practices are effectively prevented and that all work-
ers, without distinction whatsoever, may participate in
the election of representatives (ILO, 2016c). The EU also
echoed these concerns (ILO, 2016a). As yet, the govern-
ment has not taken any action to address this issue.
3.5. Labour Law Reform
The government of Bangladesh did pass modest reforms
to the Bangladesh Labour Act in 2013, which were in
motion well before the Compact was negotiated (Gov-
ernment of Bangladesh et al., 2013). However, the Com-
pact also obligated Bangladesh to undertake further re-
forms (Government of Bangladesh et al., 2013); the gov-
ernment failed to address nearly all the observations of
the ILO Committee of Experts in the 2013 reforms, and
in some cases made the law even less compliant with
ILO Conventions. As a result, the Committee of Experts
stated that it “deeply regrets” the failure to amend the
labour law and “urges the government, in consultation
with the social partners, to review and amend the men-
tioned provisions to ensure that restrictions on the exer-
cise of the right to freedom of association are in confor-
mity with the Convention” (ILO, 2016c). The 2016 report
of the EU reached the same conclusion (European Com-
mission, 2016a).
3.6. Freedom of Association in Export Processing Zones
(EPZs)
EPZs employ roughly 400,000 workers in Bangladesh,
who produce garments and footwear as well as a va-
riety of other manufactured goods (European Commis-
sion, 2016a). However, trade unions are banned in the
EPZs by law and only Worker Welfare Associations may
be established under the EPZ Workers’ Association and
Industrial Relations Act (EWWAIRA) of 2010. TheWorker
Welfare Associations do not have the same rights and
privileges as trade unions. However, the government had
steadfastly refused to change the law to allow unions, cit-
ing promises made to investors years ago to keep the
zones union free.15 In 2017, the ILO Committee of Ex-
perts called on the government “to ensure that any new
legislation for the EPZs allows for full freedom of associ-
ation, including the right to form free and independent
trade unions and to associate with the organizations of
their own choosing, and emphasizing the desirability of a
harmonization of the labour law throughout the country”
15 This assertion has been made on numerous occasions to the author by Bangladesh officials.
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(ILO, 2016c). The European Commission similarly con-
cluded that, “The Bangladesh EPZ Labour Act needs to
be revised to provide rights and protections at least com-
mensurate with the national labour law (BLA) and to be
fully compliant with core labour rights” (European Com-
mission, 2016a).
3.7. Upgrading Labour Inspection
The Compact required that the government signifi-
cantly improves its labour inspection (Government of
Bangladesh et al., 2013). While the government did up-
grade the Department of the Chief Inspector of Factories
and Establishments to a Directorate, it has still failed to
ensure it has a cadre of 800 inspectors as agreed in the
Compact. Beyond the numbers, labour inspectors have
a profound lack of training and professionalism which
severely weaken the effectiveness of factory inspections.
This is further undermined by the power of the industry
over the government, which does not want to see the
law enforced. In a 2017 interview with ILO Dhaka staff,
they indicated that they believed that the government
was still several years away from having a factory inspec-
tion service that could ensure building safety as well as
enforce fundamental labour rights. The EU concluded in
its most recent report that “recruitment and training of
inspectors need to continue in view of reaching the tar-
get of 800 inspectors….The recruitment and the develop-
ment of a strategy for the retention of new labour inspec-
tors needs to be taken as matter of urgency” (European
Commission, 2016a).
3.8. Fire and Building Safety
Section 2 of the Compact sets forth the government’s
commitments on fire and building safety. Under Sec-
tion 2(a), the government committed to make concrete
and time-bound improvements under the National Tri-
partite Plan of Action focused on Occupational Health
and Safety, specifically Fire and Building Safety. This in-
cluded providing access to remedies for victims of work-
place injuries. However, implementation of the plan has
been very slow and most if not all milestones in the
plan have been missed or substantially delayed. The ab-
sence of a consolidated public and transparent report-
ing of progress under the Plan contributes to the lack
of accountability.
The inspection of export-oriented RMG factories un-
der Section 2(b) was divided among the two private
initiatives (the Bangladesh Accord and the Alliance for
Bangladesh) and the national effort under the National
Action Plan. While both private initiatives completed ini-
tial inspections in 2014, the National Initiative finished
an initial inspection of the factories far behind schedule.
In its last status report, the Department of Inspection for
Factories and Establishments indicated that 300 Correc-
tive Action Plans (CAP) have been developed in factories
under the national initiative but only 5 CAPs have been
approved. Of concern, this information has not been up-
dated in over a year, as the information is from March
2016. There is no public database of the actual inspec-
tions or CAPs (Department of Inspection for Factories
and Establishments, 2016). Therefore, progress on im-
plementation is difficult to assess in the absence of a
publicly available database for the CAPs under the Na-
tional Initiative.
There is very little evidence that the crucial remedi-
ation efforts under the national initiative are in process,
and the financing of the remediationmeasures of the fac-
tories under the national effort is unclear. Recently, the
ILO highlighted the need for financing to support reme-
diation in Bangladeshi factories, which underscored the
absence of a strategy to ensure the factories under the
national initiative have the necessary financial support
for remediation.
4. Why Has the Compact Failed (2013–2016)?
There is no single explanation for the failure of the Com-
pact. Below, I explore some of the contributing factors.
4.1. The Government of Bangladesh
The government of Bangladesh has and will likely con-
tinue to be hostile to labour rights. First and foremost,
the garment industry is responsible for 82 percent of
the country’s export earnings (World Bank, 2017). Thus,
anything that would in the government’s view “jeopar-
dize” the profitability and continuity of the industry, in-
cluding trade unions, is perceived as an existential threat
and dealt with accordingly. Of course, trade unions can
contribute to a more productive and sustainable indus-
try (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; see also OECD, 2000),16
and respect for labour rights does not put countries at a
competitive disadvantage in world trade (OECD, 1996).17
Nevertheless, the government and domestic manufac-
turers have opted to avoid unions at all costs (except
when forced to do so by union organising supported by
global campaigns).
Another factor, Bangladesh has failed to upgrade the
industry—unlike many of its competitors. Bangladesh’s
success in garment exports has been based on low-
skill, low-wage competitiveness. The severe lack of ad-
equate transportation and energy infrastructure has
hampered the industry’s growth. As the World Bank
found, “Private investors are discouraged from investing
in Bangladesh because of infrastructure deficits, scarcity
and high prices of land, corruption, political uncertainty
16 “Countries which strengthen their core labor standards can increase efficiency by raising skill levels in the workforce and by creating an environment
which encourages innovation and higher productivity” (OECD, 2000).
17 “Any fear on the part of developing countries that better core standards would negatively affect either their economic performance or their competi-
tive position in world markets has no economic rationale” (OECD, 1996).
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and, of late, concerns about security. Severe scarcity of
gas and electricity is making the process of getting util-
ity connections for new businesses difficult (World Bank,
2016)”. Given these weaknesses, the government has
not moved up the value chain to higher value added
goods. As such, it continues to see its advantage in com-
peting on the basis of low labour costs—which would be
threatened if a truly robust labour movement were al-
lowed to form.
Third, the government is plagued by high levels of
public corruption and is subject to corporate capture by
the garment industry (McDevitt, 2015).18 As explained
in the New York Times, “Business interests dominate
Bangladesh’s Parliament. Of its 300 members, an esti-
mated 60 percent are involved in industry or business.
Analysts say 31 members, or 10 percent of the coun-
try’s national legislators, directly own garment factories,
while others have indirect financial interests in the in-
dustry” (Yardley, 2013; see also Chalmers, 2013).19 The
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturer’s Association (BG-
MEA) is extremely powerful, and is a key contributor to
political campaigns (Yardley, 2013).20 As a result, legisla-
tion consistent with international labour standards is un-
likely to pass without overwhelming external pressure,
and agencies charged with enforcement have no incen-
tive to do so.
Finally, Bangladesh’s garment industry has yet to
experience an economic penalty from the Rana Plaza
disaster. Only one buyer, Walt Disney, pulled out of
Bangladesh following the collapse (Greenhouse, 2013).
In fact, garment orders increased, ironically the likely
result of the negotiation of the Bangladesh Accord for
Workers’ Safety, which required signatory brands to en-
sure that its suppliers provided safe working environ-
ments (Reuters, 2015). As discussed below, over 200
companies eventually supported the Accord (Accord on
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 2017a). With the
Accord in place, brands calculated that the risk of sourc-
ing from Bangladesh had dropped to an acceptable level.
Indeed, the success of the Accord has demonstrated that
respect for workers’ rights, or at least the avoidance of
workplace injuries or fatalities, is good for business.With
the manufacturers prospering, the government has had
no incentive to change course.
Neither the government nor the industry has paid
a penalty for its aggressive anti-unionism. Both under-
stood that they could ignore the Compact without con-
sequences for its trade relationship with the EU.
4.2. The EU
Despite growing concerns, the European Commission re-
mained extremely reluctant through 2016 to commence
an investigation (European Parliament, 2015, para. 25).21
This is in part due to a deep-seated faith of the EU institu-
tions in European social dialogue, which favours cajoling
over measures to compel another party to act or to sanc-
tion that party for inaction. Even after years of broken
promises, the EU was not moved to threaten an inves-
tigation leading to the withdrawal of preferences until
early 2017 (as explained in Section 5).
Another basis for the reluctance is that the levy of
duties on imports of Bangladesh-made garments would
mean that EU-based companies would suddenly face
substantially higher costs for its goods. As confirmed
in informal conversations in Brussels, the EU’s Trade
Commissioner has been reminded of this fact by Euro-
pean brands.
At amore technical level, the EuropeanCommission’s
institutional reluctance is compounded by a misguided
interpretation of its own GSP Regulation (Vogt, 2015).
The Directorate General for Trade of the European Com-
mission (DG Trade) has determined that the trigger for
the commencement of an investigation is two consecu-
tive “special paragraphs” in the reports of the CAS. This
approach reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of
the ILO supervisory system and all but guarantees EU
inaction. The CAS is the more political body within the
ILO supervisory system and a decision to issue a special
paragraph requires the consent of both worker and em-
ployer representatives—the latter of whom are often
very reluctant to do so. Bangladesh did receive a special
paragraph from the CAS in 2016, aided by the fact that
the employer spokesperson had participated in the High
Level Tripartite Mission earlier that year and had seen
how bad the situation was only weeks before the Inter-
national Labour Conference. However, the employers
group flatly refused to agree to a special paragraph in
2017, despite the lack of progress, because they knew it
would trigger an investigation. Thus, in adopting this pe-
culiar interpretation of the GSP regulation, the EU has es-
sentially delegated decision-making to a small, unelected
body of employers in a single supervisory committee of
the ILO (Vogt, 2015). Though it is not certain that the gov-
ernment of Bangladesh would improve compliance with
fundamental workers’ rights were a GSP investigation to
be commenced, the loss of preferential access to the EU
18 “Politics in Bangladesh can be characterised as a battle between established elites over state resources. A culture of confrontational politics between
the country’s two main parties has weakened the rule of law and led to the politicisation of state institutions, including the judiciary and bureaucracy.
At the same time, political parties and parliament are increasingly being taken over by powerful business interests. Thus, despite a relatively strong
legal framework, weak implementation and political interference undermine anti-corruption efforts in Bangladesh. As a result, corruption is an endemic
problem in Bangladesh at all levels of society” (McDevitt, 2015).
19 “More than 30 garment industry bosses are members of parliament, accounting for about 10 percent of its lawmakers” (Chalmers, 2013).
20 “‘This organization [BGMEA] is extremely powerful’, said one senior government official, who said much of its clout comes from political contributions.
‘The political parties are running after money’” (Yardley, 2013).
21 The European Parliament has been less circumspect and has called on the Commission to determine whether Bangladesh is complying with the GSP
conditionality in 2015. In late 2016 and early 2017, members of the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament visited Bangladesh and
warned the government that the EU is running out of patience.
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garment market—14.8 billion euros in 2016 (European
Commission, 2017b)—would seem to be a very consid-
erable incentive.
4.3. The US
In 2013, immediately following the Rana Plaza collapse,
the US suspended its GSP benefits to Bangladesh in re-
sponse to a 2007 petition by the AFL-CIO concerning
widespread labour violations, including violations of the
right to freedom of association, to bargain collectively
and to eliminate child labour (Greenhouse, 2016). An ac-
tion plan based on an investigation into the complaint and
seven years of dialogue failed to bring about meaningful
reforms (US Department of Labor, 2013). For the US, the
Rana Plaza disaster was the last straw, confirming years
of indifference for workers’ rights and well-being. The
suspension did get the attention of the government of
Bangladesh as it was a negative signal to themarket. Bilat-
eral engagement on labour issues did increase as a result.
However, as Bangladesh’s garment exports did not bene-
fit under the US GSP scheme (unlike the EU), the impact
of the suspension was minimal in economic terms. In the
end, with the Bangladesh Accord in place, and a secure
market in the EU, the suspension of the US GSP was not
sufficient leverage for change and most violations contin-
ued apace after 2013. While the US does participate in
the oversight of the Compact, its economic leverage over
Bangladesh is reduced given that it has little more it can
do to sanction poor performance on labour rights.
4.4. The Global Brands
The Rana Plaza disaster, and the continued failure of
manufacturers in Bangladesh to respect fundamental
workers’ rights, is a structural feature of global supply
chains as currently configured–particularly in the gar-
ment industry. Brands look to cut costs in their supply
chains through several means, from negotiating down
the costs of the goods they source to, maximizing effi-
ciency and reducing tax and other expenses. At the same
time, brands look to turn product orders around quickly
to respond to expectations of consumers–so called fast
fashion. This puts considerable pressure on manufactur-
ers to drive down wages and benefits, push for exces-
sive overtime, and cut corners on working conditions.
This also creates a situation where unionization will cut
into small margins, especially at lower tier manufactur-
ers, and thus unions are opposed by any means (ILO,
2016d, paras. 60–64).
At the same time, Rana Plaza exposed the failure of
the CSR initiatives and social auditing to detect and rem-
edy violations of workers’ rights in global supply chains.
While these schemes have sometimes been able to iden-
tify workplace violations such as wage and hour and oc-
cupational safety and health issues, they have generally
failed to detect violations that are not readily apparent,
such as violations of the right to freedom of association
and to bargain collectively (ILO, 2016d, para. 138; see
also Locke, 2013, p. 20).22 Social auditors are generally
not adequately trained and do not spend adequate time
to detect any but themost obvious violations (ILO, 2016d,
para. 138). Brands have also failed to adopt sufficient
measures to identify which companies are even produc-
ing goods in their supply chains, particularly beyond the
Tier I suppliers. If steps are not taken to clearly map their
suppliers, it will be impossible to ensure brands’ compli-
ance with human rights policies.
5. Potential for Progress in 2017?
On 16 March 2017, in a break with the typical diplo-
matic language, three senior European Commission of-
ficials sent a strongly worded letter to the Ambassador
of Bangladesh to the EU. It explained:
We will need to demonstrate to the European Parlia-
ment, Council of Ministers and to civil society that
Bangladesh is taking concrete and lasting measures
to ensure the respect of labour rights. This will be es-
sential for Bangladesh to remain eligible for the EBA
regime. Without such progress, our monitoring could
eventually lead to the launching of a formal investiga-
tion, which could result in temporary withdrawal of
preferences. (Newage, 2017)
The letter followed a staggering display of anti-union an-
imus by the government of Bangladesh. Starting on 11
December 2016, garment workers launched a peaceful
demonstration for higher wages in Ashulia, an area near
the capital city of Dhaka (see Kaman, 2016).23 The min-
imum wage for garment workers remains a mere 5,300
taka per month (roughly $67 USD), an amount below the
World Bank poverty line (Fair Labor Association, 2016,
p. 3).24 and neighbouring garment-producing nations like
Cambodia.25 Police rounded up at least 34 union leaders
and activists, many of whom were not even in Ashulia at
the time. The government subsequently lodged criminal
charges against them and manufacturers subsequently
filed claims alleging property damage (Human Rights
22“Private compliance programs appear largely unable to deliver on their promise of sustained improvements in labor standards in the new centers of
global production” (Locke, 2013).
23 The epicentre of the strike was atWindy Apparels Ltd in Ashulia, where workers began to demand a rise in wages. The strike was ignited two months
after a young woman worker died on the factory floor after repeatedly being denied medical leave by her supervisor. Her body was simply discarded
by management on the street outside the factory gates for her family to pick up. An account of her tragic death at 23 years old was reported in Slate
(Kaman, 2016).
24 “The FLA found that for factories assessed in Bangladesh the purchasing power of average compensation—a measure that includes base pay, and
some benefits and incentives, but excludes overtime—fell below the World Bank poverty line” (Fair Labor Association, 2016).
25 Through strikes and demonstrations, the minimumwage in the garment industry in Cambodia rose in recent years from $60 USD in 2013 to $170 USD
per month in 2018.
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Watch, 2017). BGMEAorganised factorymanagers to sus-
pend, dismiss or force to resign well over 1,600 work-
ers in a coordinated closure of roughly 60 garment facto-
ries (Human Rights Watch, 2017; see also Safi, 2016). Po-
lice raided the offices of several trade unions and labour
rights NGOs, disrupting their activities and forcing their
doors closed.
On 18 May 2017, the 3+5 Group convened in Dhaka
to formally review the government’s progress under the
Compact and to raise concerns about the recent crack-
down in Ashulia. Just prior to the summit, the govern-
ment withdrew a 2016 draft EPZ labour law, which would
have maintained the prohibition on trade unions in the
zones (Bdnews24, 2017). The government also signalled
a commitment to adopt a new EPZ labour law, though it
has yet to follow through.
The “Joint Conclusions” of the summit committed
the government to comply with the original terms of the
Compact as well as to respect the post-Ashulia agree-
ment (European Commission, 2017a). In another letter,
issued on 31 May 2017 the European Commission again
took a firm position.26 It explained that:
Muchmore needs to be done to address the ILO’s rec-
ommendations on freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining ahead of the 106th Session of the In-
ternational Labour Conference on 7 June 2017. The
EU is concerned that so far no reply has been given to
its letter of 16 March and that no strategy with con-
crete and time bound actions has been presented at
the Compact meeting, in order to address the ILO’s
recommendations, as was requested in the letter.
The EU gave the government a deadline of the end of Au-
gust “to deliver tangible progress”. The letter concluded
by explaining that:
With regard to the preferences granted to Bangladesh
under the EU’s GSP Regulation, we would like to recall
that Bangladesh needs demonstrate as a matter of ur-
gency concrete and lasting measures are taken to en-
sure respect of fundamental human and labour rights.
This will be essential for Bangladesh to remain eligible
for the Everything but Arms regime.
At the International Labour Conference, Bangladesh was
again hauled before the CAS for its failure to comply with
Convention 87 (ILO, 2016e). In that session, it announced
its commitment to amend both the Bangladesh Labour
Act and the EPZ Labour Act in 2017. It also reported on
having adopted the new SOPs for union registration. For
the first time, the government appears to perceive amea-
surable economic risk to maintaining the status quo. As
of this writing, however, the government has initiated a
process to review the Bangladesh Labour Act, but has not
circulated any drafts for comment by the social partners.
It is far too early to know whether the government in-
tends to address the concerns of the ILO Committee of
Experts and will expend the political capital to see them
passed. Further, there is no data to ascertain whether
the SOPs have made any difference concerning registra-
tion. As in the BIGUF case cited above, applications for
union registration continue to be rejected arbitrarily de-
spite the new procedures.
It remains to be seen whether the EU will over-
come its institutional reluctance if there is still insuffi-
cient progress made in the coming months. As of this
writing, DG Trade remains steadfast in its opposition to
commencing an investigation.27 If that position contin-
ues, one can expect that the government of Bangladesh
will undertake the minimum to forestall the threat of a
GSP investigation.
6. New Compliance Mechanisms
It was common knowledge among the global brands that
most factories in Bangladesh were poorly constructed,
had faulty wiring, lacked fire exits and that doors were
often locked; however, the cost of providing a safe work-
place was deemed too expensive for brands and thus no
action was taken (Greenhouse, 2012).28 The Rana Plaza
disaster also exposed a deep crisis in the code of conduct
and audit model, given that garment factories in Rana
Plaza and elsewhere had been certified despite unsafe
working conditions or repeated violations of fundamen-
tal worker rights (see Section 4 above). This crisis cre-
ated the opportunity for a new model—the Bangladesh
Accord for Fire and Building Safety and Better Work
Bangladesh. Notably, a similar proposal had been pre-
sented to brands before the Rana Plaza disaster given
the outbreak of deadly fires like Tazreen Fashions (Bajaj,
2012), but only two brands expressed any interest. The
Accordwas negotiated in the days immediately following
Rana Plaza, as global brands panicked knowing that sig-
nificant action needed to be taken if they were to be able
tomaintain their sourcing relationships in Bangladesh. In
the end, over 200 brands, mostly European, signed on to
the Accord.
TheAccord signals an important breakwith pastmod-
els in that it is a legally binding instrument among brands,
retailers and trade unions to ensure the safety of the
factories where the signatory brands source their goods
(Anner, Bair, & Blasi, 2013). The Accord carries out in-
dependent inspections in which unions and workers are
involved. All the inspection reports and corrective plans
are publicly disclosed. Brands also had to commit that
if a factory was unable to remediate based on the cor-
rective plans, that the brand would ensure that funds
26 Letter on file with the author.
27 Based on a call between the author and DG Trade on 10 July 2017.
28 The article reports on a 2011 meeting of government, manufacturers, brands and NGOs during which the director of ethical sourcing from Walmart
rejected proposed improvements in electrical and fire safety. They noted that such improvements would need to be made to around 4,500 factories,
would be “very extensive” and “not financially feasible” (Greenhouse, 2012).
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were available to do so. A complaintsmechanismwas cre-
ated and workers were instructed on the right to refuse
unsafe work. According to its 8 May 2017 report: “The
overall remediation progress rate of safety issues iden-
tified in initial inspections reported or verified as fixed
has reached 77 percent. Remediation is close to comple-
tion at more than 400 Accord Factories which have com-
pleted more than 90% of the remediation. 61 factories
have completed all remediation from initial inspections”
(Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 2017b,
p. 4). In 71 cases, the Accord terminated supplier rela-
tionships with brands because of the failure of the fac-
tory to meet the safety standards set out in the agree-
ment (Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh,
2017b, p. 12).
The success of the Accord comes from the fact that
it can terminate sourcing relationships between brands
and suppliers when the latter do not live up to the fire
and building safety requirements. This is significant eco-
nomic leverage over a factory, which the Accord has
used when warranted by the evidence. The inclusion of
workers in the governance of the Accord, as well as the
plant level inspection, also certainly improves the quality
of the labour inspection. Most importantly, the Accord
has succeeded in eliminating worker deaths in the facto-
ries it covers (with the exception of a boiler explosion in
2017; Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh,
2017c), an impressive feat given that there were over
1,350 deaths in the garment sector just between 2010
and 2013.29
The Accord also helped to empower workers. Safety
training had been rare and workers had no role in safety
management. Joint worker-management safety commit-
tees were established in factories covered by the Accord,
and workers on the committees were trained on their
rights and best practices. All workerswere provided basic
information about their rights ensure their safety atwork.
As of May 2017, over a million workers have received in-
formation about their rights (Accord on Fire and Building
Safety in Bangladesh, 2017d, p. 15).
On 29 June 2017, the Accord was renewed (Accord
on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 2017e). One
important advancement with the new Accord is that it
requires factories to respect the freedom of association
of workers as it relates to safety and health (Accord on
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 2017e). It is un-
clear how many of the brands under the original Accord
will sign the new one, though nearly 50 brands signed on
as of October 2017 (IndustriALL Global Union, 2017b).
The Accord has not been without its critics, which
have argued that the Accord (and the Alliance for
Bangladesh Worker Safety) cover only a small portion
of the RMG sector leaving workers in many factories,
particularly those in the subcontracted factories that do
not directly export, outside the scope of these initiatives
(Labowitz & Baumann-Pauly, 2015; but see Anner & Bair,
2016).30 It is certainly true that not all workers are cov-
ered by the Accord. It is also true that not all manufac-
turers have made the necessary remedial steps to com-
ply with the Accord. And, some brands have been taken
to arbitration for failure to cover the costs of remedi-
ation. However, this should not diminish the progress
made by the Accord, and limitations in the scope of com-
mitments or coverage reflects more the reluctance of
brands to move further than an inherent flaw with the
Accord model.
The government of Bangladesh and the BGMEA,
which have long resented their exclusion from the gov-
ernance of the Accord, announced the launch of a paral-
lel initiative. While details are not yet available, one sus-
pects that it will be less onerous and accountable given
that the government and BGMEA will have a say in its
operation, likely joined by government dominated trade
unions (UllahMirdha, 2017). Asmentioned above, the in-
spections which were under the purview of the govern-
ment under the National Action Plan were flawed and
incomplete, and the lack of transparency make impossi-
ble the ability to assess what corrective measures, if any,
have been taken. Of note, global unions and the govern-
ment reached an agreement in late October on the even-
tual phase out the 2018 Accord. Under its terms, a com-
mittee comprised of industry, labour and the ILO will, af-
ter May 2018, determine every six months whether the
government has achieved the capacity to monitor the in-
dustry and enforce the law effectively. If such a determi-
nation is made, responsibility for fire and building safety
would revert to a national body after a further 6 months
(IndustriALL Global Union, 2017c).
It should also be noted that Better Work Bangladesh,
a joint program of the ILO and the World Bank, is
now also operational in the country. Better Work has a
broadermandate, in that it assesses conditions on funda-
mental labour rights as well as conditions of work, from
wage and hour laws to occupational safety and health.31
Currently it is monitoring 136 factories in Dhaka which
supply to roughly 30 brands. In addition to these assess-
ments, Better Work works with factories to provide ad-
vice and training to management to assist them to make
continuous improvements. Better Work publishes syn-
thesis reports which note which violations have been
detected and which have been remediated after follow-
up. The incentive for factories to participate include the
higher productivity that will result from better labour-
management relations and the reduction in the number
29 This figure includes the reported estimated death tolls at Gharib and Gharib (2010, 21), Hameem Group (2010, 29), Tazreen Fashions (2012, 112),
Smart Exports (2013, 8), Rana Plaza (2013, 1135) and Tung Hai Sweater (2013, 8).
30 Report arguing that the Accord and the Alliance cover “only 27% of factories, which tend to be larger and better resourced than all other factories”
amounting to about half the workforce. A rebuttal report was issued in 2016. See Rebuttal report arguing that “more than 70% of garment workers in
Bangladesh are covered by the Accord and the Alliance, and if we include workers employed in factories inspected by the ILO-advised National Initiative,
the percentage of covered workers reaches 89%”.
31 For more information, visit the Better Work Bangladesh website at https://betterwork.org/where-we-work/bangladesh
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of audits as brands will accept Better Work assessments
without requiring their own. As Better Work is still rel-
atively new to Bangladesh, it has yet to publish its first
synthesis report.
7. Conclusion
For workers in Bangladesh’s garment industry, the situa-
tion remains dire. Worker rights violations are the norm
and safety concerns are especially serious outside of
Accord-covered factories. At the same time, Bangladesh
remains a global powerhouse for garment production
and continues to export worldwide. Indeed, the repres-
sion has ensured that labour costs remain among the
lowest in Asia. The only thing in recent years that created
sufficient pressure on the government and industry to re-
form was the Rana Plaza disaster, and even then, the re-
formonworkers’ rights was partial and fleeting. It is clear
that unless there is a substantial economic incentive to
change, for the government, for manufacturers and for
global brands,wewill not see the necessary changes take
place. Clearly, the Compact has not provided an incen-
tive, as no credible threat of economic harm was ever
posed. On the other hand, we have seen trade unions
and brands at the very least create the legal framework
necessary to promote the limited issue of the safety of
garment factories. Whether this is replicable elsewhere
remains to be seen, as it took a tremendous tragedy for
brands to agree to the Accord in the first place.
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